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CELIA R. TAYLOR*
The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty
Doctrine:  Why Corporate
Managers Have Little to Fear
and What Might Be Done
About It
I certainly knew [my behavior] was nefarious, a little wormy,
unethical, make no mistake about that. . . . [B]ut I was cer-
tainly willing to take the risk.
—Jay Jones1
In the wake of recent and ongoing financial scandals, legisla-tors and regulators rushed to address corporate malfeasance,
most notably through rapid enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.2  The result of these actions is yet to be determined.
What is  clear is that the laws on the books at the time of the
Enron and WorldCom debacles proved ineffective to prevent dis-
aster.  How could corporate law fail to provide sufficient deter-
rence?  How did so many get away with so much for so long?
Why did corporate directors feel they had little to fear?
One contributing explanation can be found by examining the
* Associate Professor of Law, Strum College of Law at the University of Denver.
B.A., George Washington University, 1986; J.D., New York University School of
Law, 1989; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 2004.  Many thanks to all those kind
enough to review drafts of this Article and provide comments.
1 Bruce Porter, A Long Way Down , N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at
52 (quoting Jay Jones).
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208 (Oct. 30, 2002) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274); Improper Influ-
ence on Conduct of Audits, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,325 (Oct. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240); see also  NYSE Group, Inc., Final NYSE Corporate Governance
Rules (2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (publish-
ing the Section 303A Final Rules).
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history of corporate law and its treatment of corporations and
corporate managers, specifically by looking at the interplay be-
tween strict regulation, permissive laws, and traditional fiduciary
duty doctrine.  This examination reveals a historical shift away
from rigid regulatory control over corporate behavior to an ex-
tremely permissive regulatory regime.  This shift occurred in re-
sponse to both changing economic conditions and evolving
theoretical conceptualizations of the corporate form.  The com-
bined impact of these practical and theoretical changes in the
corporate arena eventually gave rise to a situation where Ameri-
can corporations, led by their officers and directors, act with little
direct external regulation.
Further consideration of this devolution in the treatment of
corporations and corporate management from strict regulatory
control to permissive regimes shows that, whether consciously or
not, regulators seemed willing to permit more flexibility in statu-
tory corporate regulations as long as the common law required
corporate behavior to be controlled by strict fiduciary duties.  By
the regulators’ logic, if stringent fiduciary duties, specifically du-
ties of loyalty and care, would be imposed by common law and
enforced by courts, statutory control could take a backseat.  As
we shall see, corporate evolution continued to follow this path
for some time.
Regulation governing corporate behavior gradually decreased
its reliance on what was considered to be a demanding regime of
fiduciary duty.  Regrettably, fiduciary duty doctrine followed a
similar path.  While the duties of loyalty and care may once have
operated to impose some real constraint on corporate manage-
ment, over time their viability has largely been erased.  So what
happens when the control over corporate managers intended to
be exercised by fiduciary duty doctrine disappears or is at least
seriously undermined?  The corporate malfeasance being re-
vealed every day suggests a serious breakdown.
This Article begins from the premise that reliance on fiduciary
duty doctrine to control corporate managerial behavior, as that
doctrine is currently interpreted and applied, does not and can-
not work.  Under the current state of the law, corporate manag-
ers have little reason to fear that courts will find them liable for
breach of fiduciary duty.  They can act with virtual impunity, con-
fident that they can flaunt the notion of fiduciary duty and courts
will not often challenge directorial loyalty nor second-guess their
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managerial decisions.  This confidence helps to explain the mis-
deeds of corporate managers such as Kenneth Lay, Bernie Eb-
bers, and Dennis Kozlowski.
This Article explains the current state of corporate responsibil-
ity by focusing on what has been largely disregarded in academic
discourse to date:  the interconnectedness of regulatory regimes
and fiduciary duty doctrine.  Part I begins by examining the his-
tory and evolution of regulatory control over the corporate form.
In doing so, it shows the gradual loosening of control over corpo-
rations as those entities gained prominence in the United States
economy.  This section also explains how the development of the
corporation as an entity and the rapid growth of its use caused
theoreticians to alter their conceptualization of what a corpora-
tion is.  This discussion shows how these changing conceptualiza-
tions of the corporate form worked hand-in-hand with changes in
the practical nature of the firm to explain and justify an extreme
loosening of regulatory control.  Part I also shows that this loos-
ening was accepted because of the belief that common law fiduci-
ary duty doctrine would provide sufficient monitoring of
managerial behavior.
Part II of this Article outlines the devolution of those corpo-
rate fiduciary duties that were supposed to safeguard the corpo-
rate arena.  It explores the historic bases of the traditional
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and examines how far the
doctrine has moved from these historic baselines over time.  This
perspective shows that the effectiveness of traditional fiduciary
duties as a control mechanism over corporate management has
diminished greatly over time to the point where they now are of
little effect.
The Article concludes that the loosening of regulatory control
over corporate management, in the mistaken belief that fiduciary
duty would provide sufficient disciplining incentive, helped cre-
ate a culture where the current corporate scandals could flourish.
It then suggests that a renewed emphasis on fiduciary duty is nec-
essary to rebuild trust in the corporate arena and help forestall
further bad action.  In particular, the newly articulated duty of
good faith shows promise.  If this duty is carefully defined and
consistently applied, perhaps fiduciary duty could play its in-
tended role and prove effective in exercising some meaningful
constraint on corporate managerial behavior.3
3 The Delaware Supreme Court has announced that there is no independent duty
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I
THE EVOLUTION OF ENABLING CORPORATE REGULATION
The nature and role of corporations in the United States econ-
omy have changed dramatically over time.  In tandem with these
changes in the practical functioning of corporations, theoretical
conceptualizations of what constitutes a corporation have also
changed greatly.4  These changes, in turn, led to changing views
on how business entities and their managers should be regulated.
In their earliest form, corporations were not the business enti-
ties we think of today, but instead took the form of municipali-
ties, universities, and guilds created by English royal charter.5
When the corporate form was instituted in America, a similar
approach was used.  Under early American law, corporations
could exist only pursuant to a charter granted by a legislature
upon special application.6  Each special charter stipulated the ob-
ligations and privileges of the particular corporation, specifying
for instance its permitted behaviors and required capital.7  This
system prevailed because of the then-dominant conceptualization
of the corporation as an artificial entity owing its very existence
to the willingness of the state to grant its being.  As a strictly
state-created entity, a corporation was considered properly sub-
ject to regulation and control by its creator.  This understanding
of a corporate being gave rise to the concession theory of corpo-
rate regulation.8  This theory held that since corporations existed
only at the will of the sovereign, a corporate entity possessed
of good faith, holding that “a failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results,
ipso facto , in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”  Stone ex rel.  AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).  Good faith remains an
important concern, however, as a “failure to act in good faith may result in liability
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condi-
tion ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’” Id.  at 369-70 (quoting Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
4 See, e.g. , JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY:  A
SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 82-86 (2003); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from History , 41 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1989).
5 See Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession?  An Essay on the History of Cor-
porate Law , 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000).
6 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 132 (1970) (“With no substantial
exception, to 1800 and for some years beyond legislatures provided incorporation
only by special charters . . . .”).
7 See id.  at 133-35.
8 See  Bratton, supra  note 4, at 1475. R
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only those rights and privileges specifically granted to it by that
sovereign.9
This conceptualization of the corporation clearly gave strong
regulatory control to states through their exclusive and individu-
alized charter authority.  State legislatures, carrying on the work
of the colonial assemblies, issued special charters conferring lim-
ited rights to corporations.10  These rights, which typically in-
cluded, among others, limited liability and the right to pool
capital, were understood to be the only rights possessed by cor-
porations receiving a special charter.11  One of the earliest judi-
cial pronouncements of the artificial entity and concession
theories came in the famous case Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward ,12 where the Court stated that a “corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it
. . . .”13
The theoretical conceptualization of corporations and the reg-
ulatory regime governing their behavior began to change in the
nineteenth century.  With the growth of the American economy
and increasing industrialization, corporations and the activities
they engaged in became increasingly large and complex.  Led by
banking and transportation concerns, more and more businesses
sought corporate charters14 because of the important benefits the
corporate form conferred.  As corporations, businesses gained le-
gal personality, the ability to centralize management, the power
to issue transferable shares, and the right to limit the liability of
individuals participating in the enterprise.15  These important ad-
vantages gave businesses an increased desire to operate in the
corporate form as the scale of their operations grew.
9 Id.
10 See HURST, supra  note 6, at 132. R
11 Id.
12 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
13 Id.  at 636.
14 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 189 (2d ed. 1985)
(“In Pennsylvania, 2,333 special charters were granted to business corporations be-
tween 1790 and 1860.  Of these about 1,500 were transportation companies; less than
two hundred were for manufacturing.”).
15 For an interesting argument that these reasons did not drive incorporation, but
rather that entities with overseas operations seeking monopoly rights or protection
comparable to those granted to municipalities spurred the effort, see Mahoney,
supra  note 5, at 886-87. R
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The growing demand for special charters taxed the process of
receiving such charters from state authorities on an individual
basis but did not lead to its immediate decline, in part due to the
fact that corporations were generally observed with deep-seated
distrust.  Given their genesis in monopolist enterprises and the
special status conferred upon them by the state, corporations
were viewed by many as parasitic and possessing power and priv-
ilege not available to others.16  In theory, corporate reliance on
special charters afforded states a mechanism of regulatory con-
trol over corporations:  if an entity would not accept the terms of
its charter it could not gain the advantages of the corporate form.
Maintaining control over corporations through the special
chartering system included, by definition, maintaining control
over their managers.  Under this system, managers could act only
in furtherance of the express purpose stated in the charter re-
ceived by their respective corporations.  This purpose, as noted,
was quite limited.  The desire to maintain strong control over
corporations and their managers initially fostered reluctance to
loosen the chartering system, despite its limitations.17
Eventually, however, the strong direct external regulation of
corporations and their managers made possible by the special
charter system fell victim to the demands of business.  As the
American economy grew and entities seeking the corporate form
proliferated, legislatures could not keep up with the demand for
special charters, and the inefficiency of the system became appar-
ent.18  The special charter system also came under attack due to a
perception that such charters conferred unfair privileges on only
a few.19  In response to the apparent failure of the charter sys-
tem, states began to turn to general incorporation laws.20
These laws replaced individually granted special charters with
a system that enabled any entity that complied with a standard-
ized set of requirements to gain a charter.21  Thus, while corpora-
tions still depended on license from a state to come into being,
16 See FRIEDMAN, supra  note 14, at 194. R
17 HURST, supra  note 6, at 15-16.
18 See, e.g. , Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility:  A Con-
tinuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations , 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81 (1999).
19 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 188-89 (1945) (argu-
ing that elimination of special charters and opening the availability of the corporate
form to all would reduce special favors and promote competition).
20 Id.
21 FRIEDMAN, supra  note 14, at 191-201. R
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the process became pro forma, done without individualized at-
tention and therefore without individually crafted regulatory
control over the process.  Starting with New York in 1811,22 the
trend of moving toward general incorporation statutes was so
popular that by 1859, twenty-four of the thirty-eight existing
states and territories operated under such a regime.23  By 1875,
virtually all states allowed entities engaging in private business to
obtain a general charter.24
The switch to general charters loosened, but by no means re-
moved, regulatory control over corporations.  States continued to
exert their will over corporate actions, typically by using standard
pattern incorporation statutes that required, among other things,
that corporations seeking charters be limited in size and comply
with limitations on their stated purpose.25  Thus, a glass manufac-
turer could manufacture only glass, a rubber manufacturer only
rubber, and so forth.  Any activities outside the express purpose
stated in the charter were ultra vires.26  Other common con-
straints imposed on corporations by early general incorporation
statutes included limitations on capitalization, the types of shares
a corporation could offer, and voting rights.27  The rise of general
incorporation statues caused a shift in how corporations were
regulated on a practical level, with a concurrent decline in direct
state control.  The change also mandated a shift in theories of the
corporate form.  With more and more entities operating as cor-
porations, the idea that a corporation was an artificial entity
brought into being by state action did not comport with reality.
Therefore, around the mid- to late nineteenth century, the aggre-
gate theory of the firm developed, replacing the artificial entity
and concession conceptualizations.28  This aggregation theory
drew on contemporary understandings of partnership law and
viewed the corporation as an aggregation of those private parties
22 Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, § 1, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111 (authorizing general incor-
poration for entities engaged in the manufacture of “woollen, cotton or linen
goods”).
23 See  Hamill, supra  note 18, at 103. R
24 Id.  at 106; see, e.g. , DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
25 See HURST, supra  note 6, at 25-30. R
26 See  David Millon, Theories of the Corporation , 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 209.
27 See HURST, supra  note 6, at 21, 29, 45, 56, 69; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara R
Revisited:  The Development of Corporate Theory , 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 176
(1985).
28 See  Horwitz, supra  note 27, at 184-85, 203. R
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who contracted to form the entity.29  In its early inception, the
aggregate theory of the firm considered shareholders as “the cor-
porate aggregate’s main, if not only, elements.”30  The state’s role
in regulating these entities was less significant, as shareholders
could monitor corporate behavior effectively since they, in effect,
were  the corporation.
This aggregation conceptualization of the corporate form was
short-lived because changes in the operations of corporations
also demanded changes in understandings of the corporate na-
ture and adjustment of the regulatory approaches controlling
their behavior.  The continued increase in the scale and scope of
American business from approximately 1875 to 1930 caused
states to move from using set-pattern general incorporation stat-
utes to enabling incorporation statutes.31  Entities formed under
enabling statutes could structure their affairs relatively freely
through careful drafting of their articles and bylaws; that is, states
were no longer imposing stringent conditions on access to the
corporate form.32
The increasing commonality of large firms dedicated to multi-
ple purposes33 forced theorists to reconsider issues of manage-
ment and control.  The artificial-entity conceptualization,
drawing on partnership analogies, could not hold as shareholders
clearly were not exercising control but were instead ceding that
duty to corporate managers in most cases.
Again, the changing nature of the corporate form forced us to
rethink the nature of the firm, and the real entity theory quickly
replaced the belief that a corporation was an artificial creature.
At its heart, real entity theory holds that a corporation has iden-
tity and attributes independent from its shareholders.  The real
entity theory, unlike the concession theory, states that corpora-
tions, like individuals, exist on their own and do not require state
29 Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America:
Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection , 21 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 895, 904 (1996).
30 Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation , 21
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1994).
31 Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law , 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 494 (2005).
32 See HURST, supra  note 6, at 70 (“[N]ew statutes provided a standard corporate R
structure but allowed it to be varied within a range of increasing generosity by such
departures as draftsmen might put into the corporation’s articles or bylaws . . . .”).
33 See  Bratton, supra  note 4, at 1487.  Bratton calls these entities “management R
corporations.” Id.  He characterizes them as large corporations in the business of
both marketing and producing rather than one or the other as had been the rule. Id.
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recognition to come into being.34
This shift to conceptualizing a corporation as a real entity did
not immediately signal the end of a belief that state regulation
over corporations was necessary and appropriate.  Just as an indi-
vidual was properly subject to the sovereign state, so too were
corporations, since according to real entity theory, a corporation
was the functional equivalent of an individual.35  Instead of im-
mediate removal of state regulatory control, a more subtle
change occurred with the advent of the real entity theory.  Recall
that when corporations were viewed as artificial entities, enmity
toward them ran high.  State regulation was vigorous due to the
prevailing view that corporations were worthy of suspicion and
distrust.  In strong contrast, the flourishing of the real entity the-
ory came at a time when corporations were considered essential
to promoting business.  Therefore, rather than advocating the
curtailment of corporate behavior by strict regulation, common
wisdom of the time held that corporate law should “enable busi-
nessmen to act, not . . . police their action.”36  This desire led to
regulation being kept to a minimum.37
Following the real entity conceptualization of the corporation
and the attendant universal adoption of enabling general incor-
poration statutes by the 1930s, theoretical thinking about the cor-
porate form and the proper location of regulatory authority
entered a dormant phase.  The reason for this dormancy is un-
clear, although some allege that “intellectual fashions” simply
changed.38  Rule makers, with a renewed belief in the social util-
ity of corporations, instead of looking to the nature of the corpo-
rate form as driving regulatory choices, took an approach that
focused on instrumentalism.  What mattered was enabling corpo-
rations to engage in business affairs—a departure from worrying
34 See, e.g. , W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State , 21
LAW Q. REV. 365, 376-78 (1905) (contending that corporations compel states to
grant them legal recognition); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations , 29
HARV. L. REV. 404, 424-26 (1916) (arguing that corporations exist independent of
state recognition).
35 See  Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic:  The Progressive History of Organizational
“Real Entity” Theory , 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 580 (1989) (“The real entity para-
digm implied that corporations owe their existence and legitimacy to the distinct and
unified purposes and wills of groups. . . . [T]he existence of a corporate entity was
deemed to be as real as the existence of its members.”).
36 HURST, supra  note 6, at 70 (citing A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers R
in Trust , 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931)).
37 Id.  at 75.
38 Phillips, supra  note 30, at 1070. R
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about what corporations “were” or how to control them.  Regu-
lation was kept minimal so that entrepreneurs could operate
freely.  So rampant was the liberalization of statutory restraints
that one commentator stated:  “We have nothing left but our
great empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers of
rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing
but wind.”39
Although rumblings of discontent began to surface among aca-
demics in the 1970s, the instrumentalist, antitheoretical approach
toward corporate law held sway roughly from the early 1930s to
the 1980s.40  During this time, the belief that management
needed to be free from regulation in order to run its enterprises
properly “enjoyed such widespread acceptance that it preempted
most deeper inquiry into the nature of the firm in legal theory.”41
Gone were efforts to justify regimes of corporate regulation
based on a theory of the firm.42  Managers were given great lee-
way to steer their enterprises as they saw fit.43
Despite some “anti-managerialist” voices in the 1970s44 advo-
cating for stronger external regulation of corporate managers,
real change in conceptualizations of the firm and theories of reg-
39 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy:  An Essay for Frank
Coker , 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
40 See  Bratton, supra  note 4, at 1508; Phillips, supra  note 30, at 1070. R
41 William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation:  A Critical Ap-
praisal , 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989).
42 See Bratton, supra  note 4, at 1508 (“Theory of the firm had a bad reputation R
after the realist/anti-realist debate terminated in the late 1920s. . . . By 1976, tradi-
tional theory of the firm concepts had fallen so far from view that theoretically am-
bitious works on corporate structure omitted any mention of them.”).
43 Of course, managerial power was not completely unchecked by regulation dur-
ing this time.  Several sources imposed requirements on corporate management.
These included the listing standards of the various stock exchanges, the Securities
Act of 1933, and the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.  The main thrust of these
regulations was to require disclosure.  They were generated by a concern for main-
taining the integrity of the market rather than by a thoughtful analysis of the rela-
tionship between a theory of the firm and an appropriate regulatory model.  It is
also noteworthy that, for the most part, states were not the source of these regula-
tions; instead, these directives stemmed from the federal government or a national
organization.
The emphasis on mandatory disclosure is in keeping with the virtual elimination
of other external regulation.  The theory is that if shareholders receive adequate
information, they can protect themselves against abuses perpetrated by unscrupu-
lous managers, and thus “there is no need for the government to engage in more
substantive securities regulation—merit review in the parlance.”  Troy A. Paredes,
Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Reg-
ulation , 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
44 See  Bratton, supra  note 4, at 1476. R
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ulation did not take hold until the 1980s.  At that time, the
“nexus of contract” or “contractarian” model of the corporation
gained prominence.45  Drawing on work by Armen A. Alchian,
Harold Demsetz,46 Michael C. Jensen, and William H.
Meckling,47 among others, this theory of the firm fundamentally
changes how a corporation is conceptualized by erasing the his-
toric focus on management and its job in maximizing shareholder
wealth.  Instead, contractarians posit that a firm “is a complex set
of explicit and implicit contracts.”48  Under this view, the modern
publicly held corporation is a set of contractual relationships
among the many participants in the corporate enterprise.  While
there is disagreement over how to determine participant status,
the group generally is understood to include, among others,
shareholders, creditors, and suppliers.49  Each participant in a
corporate venture assumes only those rights and obligations af-
forded it by contract.  The terms of each contract include provi-
sions of state law only to the extent that the parties to the
contract so desire.  State law requirements “are regarded as a
standard form that can be accepted by the parties or rejected ei-
ther by drafting around the provision or by incorporating in an-
other state.”50  Because each participant in a corporate contract
enters knowingly and willingly, no external monitoring or inter-
ference is necessary or desired.51
Under the contractarian conceptualization, management theo-
retically has no special place or power but is simply one of many
bargaining units.52  Under this view, external regulation over
management is not enormously important.  It can (and should)
45 The prominence of the contractarian model is subject to some debate.  While
contractarian discourse seems to dominate the academic discussion, it is unclear
whether courts, or corporate managers themselves, have abandoned the managerial-
ist view that empowers managers to act freely on behalf of their shareholders.
46 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Ec-
onomic Organization , 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
47 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure , 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
48 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract , 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989).
49 See  Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law , 39 B.C. L. REV.
283, 283 & n.1 (1998).
50 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:  A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians , 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
51 See, e.g. , Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?:  The ALI Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871 (1993).
52 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369-72 (3d
ed. 1986) (describing the corporation as a standard contract).
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nevertheless provide necessary default rules so that parties need
not negotiate certain basic points every time they contract.53  Be-
yond that, however, regulation should not put impediments on
the free negotiation of contractual arrangements.54
Discipline of corporate management then comes not from ex-
ternally imposed rules of conduct but from the policing feature of
the market.  In an efficient market (and the contractarians assert
that the market for corporate management is efficient), “a corpo-
rate shareholder gets what he is paying for in both the terms of
the contract and the substantive nature of the product, including
the quality of management .”55  Thus under the contractarian
view, not only should corporate managers be free from external
constraints other than those imposed by market forces, but cor-
porations, being themselves only a legal construct, should be sim-
ilarly unfettered.  And so we see at this point, in the evolution of
ways to conceptualize the corporation and the relationship of
such conceptualizations to regulatory schemes, a 180-degree turn
from our starting point.  No longer are corporations thought of as
creatures of the state, properly and necessarily subject to its strict
control.  Instead, they are seen as semiorganic entities of their
own right, subject to control by their contractual components as
tempered by market forces.56
This conceptualization of the corporate form and its attendant
impact on regulatory choices leaves a vacuum in some areas of
corporate governance.  Markets are generally understood to be
amoral, concerned with the efficient allocation of resources.  Ef-
ficient behavior is correct behavior, full stop.  For those less en-
amored of the contractarian view, this amoral approach toward
corporate law sits less comfortably.  To justify the loosening of
external regulation over corporations and their managers, many
relied on the belief that a vibrant regime of fiduciary duties
would provide sufficient safeguards.  As stated by one noted ju-
rist:  “The most remarkable feature of U.S. corporation law gen-
erally, and Delaware particularly, is the great importance that it
gives to the fiduciary duty concept and the resulting power of
53 See  Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature , 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 1, 28 (1985).
54 Id.
55 Butler & Ribstein, supra  note 50, at 33 (emphasis added). R
56 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (discussing the ability to draft around de-
fault rules).
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courts to apply ex post evaluations of many important types of
transactions.”57  If the fiduciary duty doctrine truly did perform
this role, reliance on it as the watchdog of the corporate arena
might be justified.  Unfortunately, as the following discussion
shows, the doctrine devolved over time and no longer performs
its appointed task.
II
NONREGULATORY CONTROL OVER CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR:  FIDUCIARY DUTY DOCTRINE
The preceding section outlined the changing roles of the firm
in the United States economy, the changing conceptualizations of
the corporation, and the impact these changes had on justifica-
tions for differing corporate regulatory models.  As shown, the
prevailing trend in corporate regulation over time has been to-
ward a great loosening of regulatory control.  This trend is not
surprising.  The growth in number and power of corporations in
the American and global economies has all but dictated this re-
sult.  This is not to suggest, however, that everyone was willing to
simply give managers free rein.  In fact, the process of liberalizing
regulatory control over corporate affairs did not pass unnoticed
or unexplained.  Courts and commentators justified this loosen-
ing by pointing to the presence of nonstatutory restraints on cor-
porate management and claiming that such restraints made
statutory regulation unnecessary.58  Specifically, corporate fiduci-
ary duties were said to provide any necessary protection lost by
the loosening of other regulation.59  Common law would provide
what statutes did not:  managers could move freely in the corpo-
rate universe, but their movements would be held in check, not
57 William T. Allen, Prof. of Law & Business, New York Univ., The Pride and
Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, Keynote Address at the Widener Univ. Sch. of
Law Symposium:  The Next Century of Corporate Law (May 20, 1999), in 25 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 70, 72 (2000).
58 William T. Allen et al., Function over Form:  A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law , 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 862-63 (2001); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corpo-
rations , 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 501 (2002) (“Delaware’s enabling statute is pre-
mised on its use within a system of corporate law that uses . . . fiduciary duties as an
additional restraint on director action.  This fiduciary restraint enables stockholders
to benefit safely from the flexibility of the DGCL’s enabling approach because the
common law limits the ability of directors to abuse that flexibility for their own self-
interest at the stockholders’ expense.”).
59 See  Allen et al., supra  note 58, at 862-63; Strine, supra  note 58, at 501. R
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by substantive regulation, but by certain minimum standards im-
posed by fiduciary duties.60
Corporate fiduciary duties have long been considered vital in
controlling corporate management.  Early conceptualization of
corporations as glorified partnerships naturally led to directors
and officers being considered subject to duties comparable to
those held by partners.61  These duties demanded selfless behav-
ior from corporate management.62  If these duties worked as ide-
alized, the excesses of corporate malfeasance so common today
would, in theory, be impossible.
So what happened to fiduciary duties as conceptualizations of
the corporation changed over time?  The following section pro-
vides an overview of the common law development of fiduciary
duties in the corporate context and suggests, as Grant Gilmore
did with the law of contract, that the “modernization” of corpo-
rate theory is causing the death of fiduciary duty.63  Like Gil-
more’s argument in regard to contracts, I suggest that
examination of the “evolution” of corporate fiduciary duty is in
fact “a study in . . . the process of doctrinal disintegration.”64
Understanding this process of disintegration and its relation to
the loosening of regulatory control over corporate behavior
greatly aids our understanding of the current crisis facing corpo-
rate theoreticians and practitioners.
A. The Historic Baseline of Corporate Fiduciary Duty
The belief that certain individuals are subject to fiduciary du-
ties is a long-standing one with its roots in equity.  The doctrine
was first expressed through decisions of the English Court of
Chancery.65  That court was charged with upholding the “con-
science of the King as seen through the moral considerations of
the dictates of the church.”66  Thus, the Chancellor was not
bound by rigid dictates of “law” but could fashion remedies, tak-
ing into consideration moral principles and current societal val-
60 See  Allen et al., supra  note 58, at 862-63; Strine, supra  note 58, at 501. R
61 See FRIEDMAN, supra  note 14, at 515-17; HURST, supra  note 6, at 78, 98-99. R
62 FRIEDMAN, supra  note 14, at 515-17; HURST, supra  note 6, at 78, 98-99. R
63 See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
64 Id.  at 101.
65 L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships , 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 70.
66 Cecil J. Hunt II, The Price of Trust:  An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the
Lender-Borrower Relationship , 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 728 (1994) (citing
FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (3d ed.
1985)).
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ues.67  These ideas led to flexible, fact-specific outcomes when
breach of trust or confidence was charged.  These notions also
demanded that the court pay heed to issues of morality and eth-
ics in determining whether fiduciaries lived up to their tasks.68
Drawing on these roots, a fiduciary relationship, as the idea is
used today, implies that forces beyond positive law are at play
and that justice and social values must be considered when deter-
mining appropriate behavior.69  Therefore, common law fiduci-
ary duties stand apart from regulation, controlling behavior not
by sanctioning specific behavior per se, but by demanding that
fiduciaries comport with standards of behavior that society
deems to be required by the fiduciary position.
In the corporate context, the existence of fiduciary duties is
well settled.  Although corporate fiduciary duties elude precise
definition70 (in part because of the fluid notion of equity), it is
generally accepted that corporate officers and directors71 are
subject to duties of care and loyalty.72  At heart, each of these
duties incorporates the belief that officers and directors owe first
allegiance to their corporation and its shareholders and, with
this, must act at all times to promote the interests of those enti-
ties rather than their own.73  When an individual agrees to act in
a managerial role and thereby “accept[s] . . . a trust of this sort,
67 Id.
68 Sealy, supra  note 65, at 70-72. R
69 See  Terry A. O’Neill, Employees’ Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constitu-
ency Debate , 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 684-85 (1993).
70 “Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American
law. . . . [D]eveloped through a jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle . . . [it]
resists tidy categorization.”  Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation , 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879.
71 Officers and directors were considered the appropriate bearers of these duties
because of the early conceptualization of the firm as a glorified partnership.  As
such, the duties already placed on partners naturally were extended to corporate
management. See  1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (West 1999) (1938).  Now, of course, majority
shareholders may also be considered subject to the same duties. See, e.g. , Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d
Cir. 1947).
72 Some now include other duties to the list of fiduciary controls on corporate
management including the duty to monitor and the duty to act in good faith. See In
re  Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-72 (Del. Ch. 1996); Hil-
lary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith , 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 456-82 (2004).  This
section of discussion is limited to the duties of care and loyalty because of their place
in the historic development of fiduciary duty doctrine.
73 See generally  Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model:  A
Director’s Duty of Independence , 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351 (1989).
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[that] person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable
diligence.”74  This obligation imposed heavy burdens.  As stated
in florid prose by Justice Cardozo in the seminal case of Mein-
hard v. Salmon ,75 a fiduciary
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.  As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveter-
ate.  Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular excep-
tions.  Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.76
Cardozo’s powerful, if overblown, rhetoric in Meinhard  ap-
pealed to morality and a sense of personal worth and responsibil-
ity, calling for a fiduciary to resort “to his own conscience, his
own understanding of how he would be perceived, in conducting
himself.”77  The duties of care and loyalty drew on these grand
notions and (in rhetoric at least) demand high standards of per-
formance from corporate managers.
Recall that in the early stages of American corporate develop-
ment, the corporation was conceptualized as a glorified form of
partnership.78  As a result, directors and officers owed sharehold-
ers duties of loyalty and care just as a partner was held to compa-
rable duties.  But what precisely did these duties entail?  With no
clear regulatory definition available,79 the task of defining the pa-
rameters of each duty was left to the common law.
The common law of fiduciary duty began to develop in the
mid-nineteenth century with the increase in size and complexity
of corporate activities.  The following sections trace the devolu-
tion of the duties of care and loyalty.
74 Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch.).
75 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).  In Meinhard , two partners were engaged in a joint
venture. Id.  at 545-46.  Without the other partner’s knowledge, the more knowl-
edgeable partner entered into an extraneous agreement to buy surrounding land in
order to increase his wealth. Id.  at 546.  An action alleging breach of the joint ven-
ture agreement ensued. Id.
76 Id. (citing Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303 (N.Y. 1926)).
77 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted , 81 B.U. L. REV. 591,
616 (2001).
78 HURST, supra  note 6, at 77-78.
79 See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404 (2005) (general standards of partner’s
conduct); id. tit. 8, § 141 (2004); id. tit. 8, §§ 144, 160, 271 (2004) (general corpora-
tion law); id. tit. 12, § 4901 (2004) (durable power of attorney).
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1. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty acted as a rule protecting against self-inter-
ested behavior and “provid[ing] against the probability in many
cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest
will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that of
[moral] duty.”80  To encourage appropriate fiduciary behavior,
the law originally imposed a blanket prohibition on self-inter-
ested transactions.  Establishing a very clear baseline, corporate
fiduciary duty of loyalty doctrine provided that any  transaction
between a corporate officer or director and his or her corpora-
tion was automatically voidable.81  It made no difference if disin-
terested directors or shareholders approved the transaction nor if
the director or officer could prove that it was fair.  The law was
inflexible in application—a strong indication of the distrust with
which corporations were considered at that time.
This blanket prohibition on interested director transactions
found expression in the “exclusive benefit rule.”  This rule re-
quired directors (i.e., fiduciaries) to act for the exclusive benefit
of their beneficiaries.82  The exclusive benefit rule applied even
when the fiduciary could benefit at no cost to the beneficiary.83
The law required from a fiduciary “peremptorily and inexorably,
the most scrupulous observance of [this] duty . . . . [A]n undi-
vided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there
shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”84
What justified the imposition of an absolute ban on self-inter-
ested transactions?  To understand the starting point of corporate
fiduciary duty of loyalty doctrine, it is important to remember the
80 Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 555 (1846).
81 See, e.g. , Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R. Co., 8 N.E. 355, 358
(N.Y. 1886) (stating the rule that all contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary in
which he or she is personally interested may be invalidated at the election of the
party that the trustee or fiduciary represents); see also  Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Direc-
tors Trustees?:  Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality , 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).
It should be noted that while this is a widely accepted statement, it is not free from
doubt. See  Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty:  Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction , 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 655, 659 (1992) (“It is submitted that this proposition [of automatic voidability]
is completely erroneous.”).
82 See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law , 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1782-83
(2001) (explaining the difference between fiduciary relationships and contractual
relationships).
83 Id.
84 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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historic development of corporations.  When the duty of loyalty
came into being in the corporate context, corporations were a
new form of entity.  Unlike partnerships, which preceded the cor-
porate form, participants in a corporation did not necessarily
know one another.  The exclusive benefit rule helped establish a
culture of trust in this newly formed business entity.  Sharehold-
ers would entrust their savings to strangers because they trusted
those individuals to act in their best interest.  Officers and direc-
tors lived up to this trust because to do otherwise would not only
break the law but also would breed an atmosphere of mistrust
and reduce the viability of the corporate form.  The duty of loy-
alty was firmly rooted in notions of truth, justice, and morality.
This, in turn, encouraged trust in business fiduciaries, which
worked to the benefit of all concerned.  Courts of the day were
not hesitant to acknowledge the importance of these values in
their discussions of the doctrine, stating that to have a contrary
rule “would be to overturn principles of equity which have been
regarded as well settled . . . to be founded on immutable truth
and justice, and to stand upon our great moral obligation to re-
frain from placing ourselves in relations which excite a conflict
between self interest and integrity.”85
2. Duty of Care
The historic baseline for the duty of care cannot be stated as
succinctly as that for the duty of loyalty.  It is clear that from its
inception, the duty of care deviated to some degree from strict
fiduciary notions.  Whereas traditional fiduciary doctrine would
hold directors liable for any harm to beneficiaries resulting from
directorial action that violated a stringent duty, the duty of care
would always afford directors significant protection, even when
their actions did cause harm to their beneficiaries.  Why is this
so?  Why should the duty of care impose any lesser standard than
that of the duty of loyalty?
The answer lies in the development of the corporation and the
changing conceptualizations and treatments of that form.  During
the latter half of the nineteenth century, corporations were be-
coming increasingly important in American economic life, while
restrictions on their activities were being eliminated.  The rise of
general incorporation statutes, together with the diminishment of
85 Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, 578-79 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1859).
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ultra vires doctrine,86 evidenced a willingness and desire to allow
corporations greater leeway in conducting their affairs.  In step
with this understanding of the appropriate role of corporations in
American life came the understanding that directors and manag-
ers had to have some degree of freedom in their management of
such entities.  Thus, rather than impose strict fiduciary duty of
care obligations on directors, early court decisions articulated the
duty of care applicable to directors as close to a negligence stan-
dard of care, finding directors liable only when they failed to ex-
ercise “ordinary knowledge,” defined as “common sense, and
ordinary attention.”87
This negligence standard is clearly more protective of directors
than a strict fiduciary standard where directors shall cause no
harm, however inadvertent.  The lower threshold for directorial
liability was deemed necessary so that directors would not be pe-
nalized for making risky, but necessary, business decisions.  Rec-
ognizing the imperfections of human knowledge, the liberal
baseline set by the historic duty of care doctrine protected falli-
ble directors.  To do otherwise, as has long been recognized,
would demand “extreme accuracy of knowledge from this or any
other class of agents, to whom of necessity a large discretion in
the choice of means must be entrusted.”88
As with the duty of loyalty, setting this standard for the duty of
care facilitated the development and functioning of business in
America.  Reducing the likelihood that a director would face
personal liability increased the chances that qualified individuals
would agree to serve and encouraged those who did serve to
make risky but necessary corporate decisions.  At the same time,
in keeping with fiduciary analysis, the standard did not cleanse
86 The doctrine of ultra vires, meaning “beyond the power,” made voidable any
act undertaken by a corporation that was not specifically permitted by its charter.
Until the mid-1800s, ultra vires acted as a serious constraint on corporate behavior.
See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Erie & N.E. R.R. Co., 27 Pa. 339, 351 (1856) (“A doubt-
ful charter does not exist; because whatever is doubtful, is decisively certain against
the corporation.”); FRIEDMAN, supra  note 14, at 518-19 (discussing the use of ultra R
vires in the mid-1800s).
87 Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829); Carol Goforth, Proxy
Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Govern-
ance:  Too Little, but Not Too Late , 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 391-92 (1994) (discussing
the history of the business judgment rule).
88 Godbold v. Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847); Jay P. Moran, Comment,
Business Judgment Rule or Relic?: Cede v. Technicolor and the Continuing Meta-
morphosis of Director Duty of Care , 45 EMORY L.J. 339, 354 (1996) (discussing the
origin of the business judgment rule).
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all directorial action but kept a strong focus on the impact of
directorial action on corporate beneficiaries.  If shareholders
claimed a breach of the duty of care, courts examined the harm
caused by the directors’ actions and their reasons for these ac-
tions in order to determine the level of negligence involved.
Thus, while setting the bar lower than absolute fidelity to share-
holder welfare, the historic baseline of the duty of care com-
ported with the general position of traditional fiduciary
doctrine.89
Corporate fiduciary duty arose as part of a system where law
and equity worked together to promote selfless behavior.  This
scheme demanded that corporate fiduciaries cede the immediate
pursuit of self-interest for the good of their beneficiaries90 and
always bear in mind the impact of their actions on shareholders.
Strict fiduciary ideals bred trust in the corporate system and sup-
ported the economic structure of business.
With this understanding of the historic bases of corporate fidu-
ciary duty doctrine, let us now examine the development and
evolution of the doctrine of fiduciary duty by considering briefly
the devolution of the duties of care and loyalty.
B. Devolution of Corporate Fiduciary Duty Doctrine
As discussed above, corporate fiduciary duty doctrine origi-
nally placed meaningful demands on directors.  The duty of loy-
alty doctrine originally held director-fiduciaries liable for any
benefits they obtained in the presence of a conflict of interest.
Duty of care doctrine compelled directorial concern and atten-
tion as to the well-being of their beneficiaries by examining the
impact of directorial action on shareholders and requiring direc-
tors to exercise meaningful care.91  The absolute prohibitions as-
89 See generally  Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care , 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 589 (2006) (analyzing current state of director duty of care in
Delaware).
90 This is not to suggest that fiduciaries are purely selfless.  More often than not,
fiduciaries receive fees for their service.
91 See, e.g. , Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (explaining that defen-
dant directors are only bound to a level of care “that ordinarily prudent and diligent
men would exercise”); Otis & Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905, 910-11 (E.D. Pa.
1945) (requiring directors to exercise care, skill, and diligence that ordinary prudent
individuals would exercise in similar circumstances), aff’d  155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir.
1946); Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1934) (“It is  . . . a well-
settled general rule that, even in the absence of a statute . . . directors . . . are bound
to exercise . . . the degree of care which a reasonably prudent director . . . would
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serted by the duty of loyalty and the significant prudence
demanded by the duty of care doctrine have long since vanished
from corporate fiduciary duty.  At this point we must ask, what
happened?  How did the fiduciary standards of loyalty and care
develop and change over time?  The trajectory of doctrinal shift
differs with respect to loyalty and care.  Each is considered
below.
1. Duty of Loyalty Evolution
a. Elimination of the Absolute Ban on Self-Interested
Transactions
Though the ban on self-interested transactions was firmly in
place during the nineteenth century through enforcement of the
exclusive benefit rule, the ban’s effectiveness had substantially
eroded by 1910.92  In the space of a mere thirty years, duty of
loyalty doctrine devolved to a point where self-interested trans-
actions were no longer treated as automatically voidable.  In-
stead, they were considered valid if approved by a majority of
disinterested directors and were not found to be unfair or fraudu-
lent when challenged.93  What caused the erosion of the prophy-
lactic rule?
Although no definitive answer can be given, several factors
may have contributed to the shift.  First, the loosening of the
standard corresponded with the changing nature of the corporate
form.  American business grew exponentially during this time,
both in terms of the number of enterprises in existence and in the
magnitude of individual corporations.94  As the conduct of corpo-
rate affairs became more prevalent and more complex, courts be-
gan to loosen the demands placed on directorial action under the
duty of loyalty, recognizing that under the exclusive benefit rule,
“it would be difficult to conduct the affairs of the multifarious
corporations of the country, many of which . . . are  . . . practically
controlled by the same directors.”95  That is, if all self-interested
exercise.”), modified in  86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev’d on other grounds , 302 U.S.
643 (1937).
92 See  Marsh, supra  note 81, at 39-40. R
93 Id. at 40 (citing numerous cases establishing this rule).
94 See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:  THE FUNDAMEN-
TAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005).
95 Genesee & W.V. Ry. Co. v. Retsof Min. Co., 36 N.Y.S. 896, 901 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1895).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-4\ORE404.txt unknown Seq: 22 17-MAY-07 12:37
1014 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 993
transactions were automatically void, business would be severely
hobbled.
Another explanation for the loosening of the exclusive benefit
rule was the fact that self-interested transactions often work to
the advantage of both the directors and  their corporations.  It is
overly simplistic to assume that simply because a director bene-
fits, the corporation is harmed.  For example, a director may
make a loan to his corporation on more favorable terms than the
corporation could otherwise obtain.  While the director certainly
may benefit financially from this transaction, so too does the cor-
poration.  Loosening the exclusive benefit rule permitted these
and other mutually beneficial transactions to occur.
While removal of the exclusive benefit rule represented a sig-
nificant step away from the historic baseline created by the duty
of loyalty, the doctrine still continued to impose meaningful re-
straints on directorial behavior.  By both requiring that transac-
tions raising a specter of conflict of interest receive disinterested
approval and examining the fairness of the transaction, courts
continued to place emphasis on the well-being of shareholder
beneficiaries.  Disinterested approval, coupled with the ability of
a beneficiary to challenge any transaction perceived to be unfair,
came to be considered sufficient protection under the duty of
loyalty doctrine.
b. Elimination of Disinterested Approval Requirement
The next shift in the standard imposed by the fiduciary duty of
loyalty occurred between 1910 and 1970. During this period,
courts modified the duty of loyalty from allowing self-interested
transactions only with disinterested majority approval and sub-
ject to a fairness challenge, to one permitting self-interested
transactions without disinterested approval provided a court did
not later find the transaction unfair.96  This shift meant that all
directors could be interested in a transaction without it becoming
96 This shift did not occur without protest.  In one of the most influential books on
corporate law ever written, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued against a loos-
ening of fiduciary duties.  Concerned that the separation of ownership and control in
corporations created automatic conflicts between the interests of directors and
shareholders, they advocated a trust model of corporate fiduciary duty that retained
higher fiduciary standards. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 219-43 (Transaction Publishers
1991) (1932); see also , William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the
Century’s Turn , 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 762-65 (2001).
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voidable because of a breach of the duty of loyalty.  This signaled
a markedly different position than that established by the base-
line duty of loyalty.  Disinterested approval was still desired but
not mandatory.  What laid behind this shift?
One factor explaining the shift is that it was not always possi-
ble to receive disinterested approval of a transaction.  At times,
all directors and all shareholders may be involved.  Arguably,
this fact alone should not preclude a beneficial transaction from
occurring, though that would be the case if an absolute require-
ment of disinterested approval was maintained.  A second ratio-
nale for the move may be found in the continued influence of
corporations and their managers in the United States economy.
A need to facilitate business growth and accommodate those re-
sponsible for promoting that growth explains the loosening of
duty of loyalty constraints.97
The shift did not remove all limitations on directorial behavior,
however.  Courts could, at the request of shareholder benefi-
ciaries, examine a transaction for fairness ex post.98  If that exam-
ination revealed that the transaction was not fair to shareholders,
the court could declare it void under the duty of loyalty.99  Thus,
while some notion of protecting shareholder beneficiaries re-
mained, the baseline of duty of loyalty analysis shifted markedly
during this time.  The focus on the protection of beneficiaries
that led to the automatic blocking of any conflicting-interest
transaction was gone.  Instead, the class intended to be protected
had to take affirmative action to challenge a transaction.
This shifting of the baseline was not necessarily an undesirable
outcome, although the cases that created this shift do not explain
their rationale for doing so.100  An absolute ban on any transac-
tion in which there is a perceived conflict of interest could pre-
vent economically efficient outcomes.101  What is important to
97 See generally  William E. Nelson, The Law of Fiduciary Duty in New York,
1920–1980 , 53 SMU L. REV. 285 (2000).
98 See  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
99 See  Judd F. Sneirson, Merger Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-
Corporate Tension , 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 573, 586-87.
100 See Marsh, supra note 81, at 40 (“One searches in vain in the decided cases for
a reasoned defense of this change in legal philosophy . . . .”).
101 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63, introductory cmt. (1984).  The judi-
cial action prescribed by the code states:
A director’s conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, set
aside, or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions, in a proceed-
ing by a shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, because the
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bear in mind is that this shift in court-imposed constraints on cor-
porate managerial behavior under the fiduciary duty of loyalty
occurred concurrently with the decline in externally imposed reg-
ulatory control over fiduciary duty.102  This combination of forces
created a growing vacuum in the model of control over corporate
managerial behavior.
c. Rise of Safe Harbor Statutes in the Duty of Loyalty
Context
As set forth in the preceding section, from approximately 1910
to 1970 fiduciary duty of loyalty doctrine underwent a significant
shift from its historic baseline.  This change was evident from
courts’ substitution of an absolute ban on self-interested transac-
tions with a rule cleansing such transactions if they were ap-
proved by a majority of disinterested directors or deemed fair by
a court.  In the 1980s and 1990s, this shift in fiduciary duty of
loyalty doctrine was cemented with the rise of safe harbor stat-
utes cleansing transactions deemed “fair.”
Safe harbor statutes governing self-interested transactions cap-
tured the common law shift in duty of loyalty doctrine.  Typically
these statutes substantially protect directors if the transaction in
question is authorized by a disinterested majority of directors or
shareholders, or, in the absence of disinterested approval, the
transaction is deemed “fair.”103  Although safe harbor statutes
typically mandate the availability of judicial review, in practice
director, or any person with whom or which he has a personal, economic,
or other association, has an interest in the transaction, if:
(1) directors’ action respecting the transaction was at any time taken in
compliance with section 8.62;
(2) shareholders’ action respecting the transaction was at any time taken
in compliance with section 8.63; or
(3) the transaction, judged according to the circumstances at the time of
commitment, is established to have been fair to the corporation.
Id. § 8.61.
102 Of course, in some areas external regulation was prevalent during this time.
Consider, for example, the strict regulations imposed upon corporations and their
directors by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
among others.  For the most, however, these acts part detailed substantive disclosure
obligations rather than normative obligations of fiduciary duty.
103 Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law cleanses self-interested
transactions if any of three conditions is satisfied:
(1) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in
good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of
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whether that review will be forthcoming depends on the context
in which the transaction occurs.  If a conflict of interest exists for
a director or officer104 and a majority of disinterested directors
approve the questionable transaction in good faith after disclo-
sure of material facts, courts will choose not to review it.105  Once
disinterested approval is received, the business judgment rule106
applies and all but insulates directors (including those with a con-
flict) from liability.107  A similar result occurs when disinterested
approval is received from shareholders.  Only when no disinter-
ested approval can be obtained will the substance of the transac-
tion be examined for fairness.
The continued emphasis on disinterested approval and the use
of the term “fair” in the safe harbor statutes suggests that tradi-
tional notions of fiduciary doctrine and the impact of directorial
action on shareholder beneficiaries will still have an important
role to play in assessing directorial conduct.  In truth, however,
closer examination of the impact of safe harbor statutes in the
duty of loyalty context demonstrates several reasons for their in-
effectiveness in imposing any real constraint on managerial
behavior.
One serious impediment to the duty of loyalty exercising any
real control over management behavior under the safe harbor
statutes lies in the determination of what “disinterested”
means.108  Recall that if a transaction receives “disinterested” ap-
a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested di-
rectors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is
specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time
it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a commit-
tee or the shareholders.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)-(3) (2001).
104 The standard of review may be different when the conflict of interest exists
between the corporation and a controlling shareholder.  Because the controlling
shareholder has the ability to dominate the board and take retaliatory action if the
transaction is not approved, a court will review the substantive fairness of the trans-
action for the corporation and the noncontrolling shareholders.  Kahn v. Tremont
Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997).
105 See  1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:  FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 274-75 (5th ed. 1998).
106 The business judgment rule is discussed infra  Part II.B.2.a.
107 See  1 BLOCK ET AL., supra  note 105, at 274-75.
108 For a thoughtful, detailed discussion of this issue, see J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
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proval, no fairness inquiry is made.  Disinterested is not defined
in the safe harbor statutes.  While those statutes sanitize transac-
tions approved by disinterested directors or shareholders, they
do not require that those with an interest in a transaction refrain
from discussing it with parties that will vote.  This presents a
strong possibility that interested individuals can exert influence
over the vote, especially in the case of self-interested directors
who present a proposed transaction to their fellow directors or
shareholders.
Another significant problem with the disinterested approval
requirement is that such approval theoretically should be based
on full information about the proposed transaction, but under
current law, directors often need not disclose many relevant
pieces of information.  For example, under Delaware law, direc-
tors need not disclose alternative valuations of a transaction109 or
the existence of alternative offers,110 among other information.
Shareholders’ limited ability to obtain full information about a
transaction undermines the utility of their “disinterested” ap-
proval.  Thus, any attempt to obtain truly disinterested approval
faces significant structural and procedural impediments.
Another problem in this area is determining what a “fair”
transaction is.  Although courts are authorized to police the fair-
ness of a transaction when no disinterested approval is received,
in truth little of this occurs.111  To mention just one of the
problems that prevent courts from conducting a meaningful re-
view, consider that fairness questions usually center on the price
of the transaction, which can typically be stated within a range.
The choice of an appropriate price within that range is then
viewed as a business decision properly made by directors.  Courts
are then, on the one hand, unwilling to challenge that judgment
and, on the other, reluctant to enter into the valuation fray.112
The result is that if directors can show that the price of a transac-
tion fell within an acceptable range, courts will not question the
fairness of it.
Speaking with Complete Candor:  Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the
Duty of Loyalty , 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641 (2003).
109 See, e.g. , In re  Vitalink Commc’ns Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 12085, 1991
WL 238816, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991).
110 See  Brown, supra  note 108, at 681 & n.197.
111 For an in-depth discussion of this problem, see Park McGinty, The Twilight of
Fiduciary Duties:  On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic
Proceduralism , 46 EMORY L.J. 163 (1997).
112 See  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-78 (Del. 1985).
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With these significant problems in mind, it is clear that the safe
harbors sterilize many transactions.  Under current duty of loy-
alty jurisprudence, “disinterested” does not mean disinterested,
and “fair” focuses on process rather than content.  Thus, the safe
harbor statutes place little meaningful fiduciary demands on cor-
porate management.  As long as “disinterested” directors follow
appropriate processes, courts generally will not review the direc-
tors’ decisions, leaving them free to act as they see fit.  It seems
fair to say that “as currently operationalized, the duty of loyalty
is hardly more than a matter of process [and is] mostly
comatose.”113
So we arrive at a point where theoretical conceptualizations of
the corporation mandate little or no external regulation of corpo-
rate management in the belief that an underlying safety net of
the duty of loyalty exists.  But as shown, the duty of loyalty doc-
trine is largely nonexistent and cannot fulfill the role envisioned
for it.  As the next section shows, a similar state of affairs is re-
vealed in an examination of the duty of care.
2. Duty of Care Evolution
a. Early Rise of the “Business Judgment Rule”
As discussed above, the law has long held corporate directors
to a truly “fiduciary” duty of care.  In recognition of the fact that
corporate managers often must make risky decisions, fiduciary
duty doctrine addressing the duty of care traditionally afforded
directors significant leeway.  In essence, the law recognized that
directors should not bear personal liability for those decisions
that turn out in hindsight to have been ill considered.114  As the
doctrine developed, this long-held view found formal expression
in the “business judgment rule.”  Under this rule, directors’ deci-
sions are presumed to have been made “on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.”115  Unless shareholders can
113 McGinty, supra  note 111, at 169-72.
114 See, e.g. , Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 346 (1850) (“If . . . the
mistake be such as the directors might well make, notwithstanding the exercise of
proper care, and if they acted in good faith and for the benefit of the [corporation],
they ought not to be liable.”); Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642,
644 (Ch.).
115 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  Earlier pronouncements of
the idea encapsulated by the business judgment rule are found in cases that predate
general corporation laws. See, e.g. , In re  Mansfield Ry., Light & Power Co., 3 Ohio
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rebut this presumption, courts generally will not impose personal
liability on corporate directors for their actions.116
The business judgment rule represents a highly unusual appli-
cation of fiduciary standards.  It is true that the initial justifica-
tion for the rule was based on notions of fairness and equity—the
very notions that underlie traditional fiduciary analysis.  Here,
however, the fairness concern was more with the fiduciary-direc-
tors and less with the beneficiary-shareholders.  What justified
this unique understanding of “fiduciary” duty?
A primary justification for the business judgment rule comes
from economically based rationale.  That is, “consistent with the
business corporation’s profit orientation, business judgment [ex-
ercised by directors] inevitably involves risk evaluation and as-
sumption.”117  Essentially, because directors must make risky
decisions if their corporations are to maximize profits, they must
be protected when those decisions do not have the desired result.
Absent the protection afforded them by the business judgment
rule, directors will be discouraged from future profit-enhancing
decisions.118  The economic rationale for the business judgment
rule within duty of care analysis was, in some sense, in keeping
with traditional fiduciary doctrine.  Directors were given the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule so that they could more
freely act to enhance corporate profits, which in theory, re-
dounded to the benefit of their beneficiary-shareholders.  Fur-
ther, the presumptive protection of the business judgment rule
attached only because directors were still required to act in the
best interest of their corporation and its shareholders.119  Thus,
App. 253, 265-66 (1914) (holding that corporate managers must exercise care to act
solely in their corporation’s best interest).
116 Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat’l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 257 & n.22 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (citing Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir.
1982)).
117 Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview , 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
615, 617 (1984) (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corp. Laws, Corporate Direc-
tor’s Guidebook , 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1603-04 (1978)).
118 The need to insulate directors when they engage in risky behavior is reinforced
by the different positions occupied by directors and shareholders with respect to
risk.  Though risky ventures pose the greatest likelihood for high return, they also
pose the greatest likelihood for substantial losses.  Directors may favor that risk
while shareholders may be more risk averse, preferring a more certain, if smaller,
return from a less risky investment. See  Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir.
1982).
119 See  Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the
Revlon Standard:  The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers , 58 ALB. L.
REV. 609, 613 (1995).
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directors were required to demonstrate a certain level of skill and
attention in their exercise of corporate affairs and were required
to make decisions based on sufficient research and information
before the protective presumption of the rule attached.
With duty of care analysis premised on an economic justifica-
tion, it was uncommon, but not unheard of, for beneficiary-share-
holders to prevail in a claim against corporate managers for
breach of this duty.  Until the mid-1980s, fiduciary duty of care
could still be said to constrain managerial behavior to a limited
degree as demonstrated by the seminal case of Smith v. Van
Gorkom.120
In brief, Van Gorkom  addressed a minority shareholder’s
claim that the board of Trans Union breached its fiduciary duty
of care by approving a merger.121  The Delaware Supreme Court
agreed,122 to the amazement and horror of most of the business
community.123  The court made clear in its opinion that it was not
deciding whether the merger itself was a good or bad deal for
Trans Union and its shareholders;124 instead, the court was con-
sidering only the process  by which the board reached its decision
to engage in the transaction.125  Essentially, the court found that
because the board acted quickly, without full and credible infor-
mation, it was not entitled to business judgment rule protection
and, absent that protection, was personally liable for breaching
its duty of care.126 Van Gorkom  showed that the courts were still
willing to pay lip service to the notion of fiduciary duty of care,
120 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  Another often-cited duty of care case imposing lia-
bility by denying business judgment rule protection is Francis v. United Jersey Bank ,
432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).  Due to the egregious nature of its facts, Francis , which
involved the duty to monitor, is not particularly relevant to a general discussion of
the protection extended by the business judgment rule.  While it is very fun to read,
its facts are so extreme as to have little precedential importance.
121 Van Gorkom , 488 A.2d at 863.
122 Id.  at 872.
123 See  Gerard C. Martin, Comment, Duties of Care Under the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act , 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1307, 1327 (1998) (“In Van Gorkom , the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule did not protect decisions
by corporate directors who were not ‘reasonably informed.’  The Van Gorkom  deci-
sion sent shockwaves through the corporate legal community largely because the
court’s approach to the business judgment rule was so unprecedented.  The reaction
included a virtual disappearance of directors’ and officers’ insurance, threats by cor-
porations to leave Delaware, and, ultimately, legislative action to permit corpora-
tions to reduce the risk to their directors.”).
124 Van Gorkom , 488 A.2d at 889.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 893.
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although, as noted by one scholar, “Courts often commence their
opinions with the stern but tired maxims of fiduciary duties . . .
only to subsequently invoke the purifying balm of the ‘business
judgment rule’ . . . to preclude inquiry into the merits of direc-
tors’ decisions . . . .”127  At this stage of the duty of care’s devolu-
tion, process review had largely supplanted substantive review
and greatly undermined the capability of fiduciary doctrine to ex-
ercise meaningful restraint.
b. Virtual Elimination of Meaningful Fiduciary Duty
Constraints
In reaction to the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom , Delaware
enacted section 102(b)(7) of its Corporation Code, enabling di-
rectors to avoid personal liability for most breaches of fiduciary
duty.128  Other states quickly followed suit with the result that
statutory protection for breaches of fiduciary duty is now availa-
ble to directors in every state.129  Naturally, once such protection
became available, corporations essentially became required to in-
clude the necessary language in their corporate charters if they
wanted to have any chance of attracting and retaining well-quali-
fied directors.  According to one study, “over 90% of a random
sample of 180 Delaware firms adopted a limited liability provi-
sion within one year of [section 102 (b)(7)’s] enactment.”130  An-
ecdotal evidence gathered by the author suggests that these
statistics remain constant today.131  It is fair to say that the vast
majority of corporate charters now prevent directors from suffer-
127 Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care:  Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule , 62 TEX. L. REV. 591,
593-94 (1983).
128 The relevant provision permits a certificate of incorporation to include:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director . . . for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law
. . . .
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
129 See  James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification , 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209-31 (1988);
see also Brown, supra  note 108.
130 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis , 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).
131 Interview with Mr. James L. Holzman, Esq., Member, Delaware Corporations
Council (date unavailable).  A search of SEC filings (where the adoption of section
102(b)(7) must be disclosed) in Delaware from July 2001 to July 2002 indicates that
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ing personally for their “bad actions.”132  While nominally sub-
ject to duties of care and loyalty, directors in most cases need not
be overly concerned.  Effectively, the terms of their corporate
contracts eliminate any meaningful fiduciary demands.
c. The Rise of the Contractarians and the Final Death of
the Duty of Care
The rise of the contractarian conceptualization of the corpora-
tion in the 1980s to a large degree provided the theoretical justifi-
cation for the virtual elimination of traditional fiduciary duty
analysis.  For contractarians, generally one simple rule of fiduci-
ary duty can be articulated:  it does not exist.133  For this group
fiduciary duties are not special duties.  Rather, “they have no
moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and
enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”134
Because all  corporate matters can be regulated by contract, par-
ties in the corporate enterprise can freely draft whatever provi-
sions they choose with regard to fiduciary duty.135  In brief, for
contractarians, because the market adequately polices corporate
management behavior, there is no need for a special doctrine of
fiduciary duty.136  According to the group’s leading lights, “there
is no subject here, and efforts to unify [the concept of fiduciary
duty] on a ground that presumes its distinctiveness are
doomed.”137  While contractarians may acknowledge the exis-
tence of fiduciary duty, they do not give it any special weight.
Instead, corporate constituents are entitled only to those protec-
tions specified in the contract they enter into as part of the cor-
porate enterprise.
While courts may not vocally accept the contractarian concep-
tualization of the firm and its conclusions regarding fiduciary
duty, we have seen in practice that the doctrine has reached a
point where it exercises no real power over corporate managers.
While courts may continue to pay lip service to traditional no-
virtually every firm making an SEC filing in that time period included the provision
in its corporate charter.
132 Id.
133 See  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty ,
36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993).
134 Id.
135 Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the
Theory of the Firm , 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 179-80 (1985).
136 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra  note 133, at 438.
137 Id.
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tions of fiduciary duty, they have ceased giving it meaningful
content.  What was to serve as the critical safeguard as external
regulatory controls were loosened has itself been largely erased.
So here we move 180 degrees from Cardozo’s statement that
fiduciary duty requires a “punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive,”138 an honor to be monitored and enforced by judicial over-
sight.  Instead of a view that fiduciary duties are important,
meaningful obligations based on moral precepts, we now find the
position that if parties choose to eliminate duties entirely, they
are free to do so without interference.
CONCLUSION:  SIGNS OF REVIVAL IN REGULATION AND
FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE
The preceding discussion shows how historical conceptualiza-
tions of the corporation led to a relaxation of external regulatory
control over firms and their management.  Examination of the
devolution of corporate fiduciary duty analysis shows that courts
no longer insist on strict adherence to traditional notions of fidu-
ciary duty.  And so we are left with a vacuum in the area of regu-
latory control over corporate management.  In this vacuum, the
types of corporate malfeasance commonplace today do not seem
so surprising.
An important question now faces corporate scholars and the
courts:  what should be done about this sorry state of affairs?
Several possibilities exist.  One could focus on the regulatory side
of the regulation/fiduciary duty equation.  In that scenario, dif-
ferent options abound.  One extreme, consistent with the con-
tractarian approach, would counsel doing nothing.  Under this
approach, the market will sort out the bad actors and self-correct.
External tinkering would only inappropriately disrupt market
forces.  A second, radically different view would argue for a
ramp up in external regulation.  This approach had some footing
as legislators and regulators rushed to implement reforms in re-
action to the Enron scandal and other debacles.  Sarbanes-Oxley
and the rule changes of some self-regulatory agencies139 exem-
plify this approach.  Either of these approaches presents pos-
sibilities, although the likelihood of success under either seems
remote.  Relying on a contractarian market-driven response did
138 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). See also supra notes 75-76
and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 2. R
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not prevent the current scandals from erupting.  The impact of
external regulatory efforts will take time to become clear.  But in
the limited time that these efforts have been in place, they have
generated a great deal of controversy as to their effectiveness.140
Instead of focusing on the statutory/regulatory approach to-
ward controlling corporate behavior, one could instead look back
to fiduciary duty doctrine.  Recall the main justifications for im-
posing mandatory corporate fiduciary duties:  first, promoting
trust and protecting parties from the actions of directors with
conflicting interests, and second, ensuring that directors make all
decisions with the interests of their shareholders in mind.  If
these duties were given real content again and courts were will-
ing to insist on compliance with them, perhaps we could begin to
stem the flood of improper behavior by corporate management.
As shown, courts now, while paying lip service to fiduciary duty
doctrine,141 do not routinely submit the behavior of corporate
management to meaningful review; however, they should.
There is some indication that a renewed attention to fiduciary
duty is possible.  Several recent cases in Delaware highlight a
growing emphasis on a duty of good faith.142  The precise param-
eters of this duty are yet to be determined.  Some commentators
have argued that good faith should stand as an independent fidu-
ciary obligation such that a failure to act in good faith could give
rise to liability.143  However, the Delaware Supreme Court ap-
peared to end this argument in Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorpo-
ration v. Ritter .144  In Stone , the court clearly announced that “a
failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto ,
140 See, e.g. , SOX Backlash Emerges as Managers Consider Total Cost of Compli-
ance , ACCT. DEP’T MGMT. REP. (IOMA, New York, N.Y.), July 2004, at 5; Judith
Burns, Is Sarbanes-Oxley Working? , WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R8; Edward
Iwata, Businesses Say Corporate Governance Can Go Too Far , USA TODAY, June
24, 2004, at 1B.
141 Allen, supra note 57, at 72. (“The most remarkable feature of U.S. corporation
law generally, and Delaware particularly, is the great importance that it gives to the
fiduciary duty concept and the resulting power of courts to apply ex post evaluations
of many important types of transactions.”).
142 See, e.g. , Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (discussing permutations
of good faith); In re  Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d. 275 (Del. Ch.
2003); In re  Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d. 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(discussing the duty of good faith).
143 See  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law , 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties:  A
Theory of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms , 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123
(2006).
144 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”145  In the court’s
view, an action taken in bad faith may give rise to a claim of
breach of the duty of loyalty because the duty to act in good faith
is subsumed within that duty, but it does not operate outside that
duty to create a third base of liability.146  In no uncertain terms,
Stone  establishes that “the obligation to act in good faith does
not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the
same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”147
Although the court refused to create an independent duty of
good faith, it did not minimize the importance of the require-
ment that corporate directors act in good faith.  Instead, the
court stated that the requirement of good faith action by direc-
tors means that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to
cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict
of interest.  It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to
act in good faith.”148
Precisely where these statements place the role of good faith
remains to be seen.  What is clear is that cases such as Caremark
International,149 Walt Disney Co. ,150 and Stone  have revitalized a
fiduciary duty discussion in the courts and among commenta-
tors.151  The vibrant discourse regarding fiduciary duties sparked
by these cases and all-too-real–world events brings renewed
hope that fiduciary duty doctrines can exert some meaningful
control over corporate behavior.
Although we have seen the dismantling of classic conceptions
of the corporation and a severe decline in the effectiveness of
fiduciary duty doctrine, change is  possible.  As Grant Gilmore
stated:  “[T]here are alternating rhythms of classicism and ro-
manticism. . . . Perhaps we should admit the possibility of such
alternating rhythms in the process of the law.”152  With public
outrage over corporate mismanagement running high, we have a
window of opportunity to reassert and revitalize corporate fiduci-
ary duty.  Fiduciary duty is dead—long live fiduciary duty.
145 Id.  at 369.
146 Id.  at 370.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
150 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
151 See, e.g. , Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law ,
57 SMU L. REV. 353 (2004); Sale, supra note 72. R
152 GILMORE, supra  note 63, at 102. R
